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ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis I have written aims to investigate the underlying reasons why France 
has considered Islam as unassimilable and why it has targeted Muslim women’s bodies to 
force assimilation. In the first section of the thesis, I examine the colonial relationship 
between France and Algeria. I conclude that Algeria’s independence from France 
significantly influenced the negative treatment towards immigrants in postcolonial 
France. I then study the racist discourse that dominated French politics in the 1980s; and 
clarify how this has laid the foundation for the first attempt to ban the headscarves in 
public schools during the 1980s. The final section explores the 2004 ban on conspicuous 
religious symbols, a ban that significantly targeted the headscarf. I conclude that the 
prohibition of the headscarf undermined the rights of Muslim women and symbolized 
France’s inability to accept Islam, since France feared Islam’s visibility weakened a 
dominant French identity.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The veil is a piece of cloth that covers the hair and is worn in many regions across 
the world to represent modesty or devotion to God. However, post 9/11 the veil has 
become a symbol exclusively associated with radical Islam and/or a symbol of Muslim 
women’s oppression and subjugation. The thesis I have written will exclusively focus on 
France’s relation to its Muslim citizens and/or residents since they have been at the center 
of ongoing political debates. I will use the term Muslim, Arab and Immigrant 
interchangeably; while the terms may not be synonymous, politicians and the media have 
used it synonymously in the hijab debates. However, the thesis will particularly focus on 
the Algerian community living in France since they share one of the longest and most 
brutal colonial histories with France. I will also use the terms hijab, headscarf, and veil 
interchangeably since the terms are synonymous.  
The two key concepts that I would like to clarify are assimilation and 
communalism.  Brubaker explains that “assimilation is a process of becoming similar, 
making similar or being treated as similar” (2001, p. 543). However, the concept of 
assimilation has not been positively perceived in multi-ethnic societies, and many argue 
that assimilation lacks appreciation for diversity. The policies that aim to encourage 
assimilation also do it at the expense of people’s will, as evident in the ban of hijabs in 
French public schools. Communalism is often seen as a threat to assimilation since 
individuals place a small subset of their identity, such as their race, ethnicity, or religion 
above the national community. Communalism reinforces differences whereas 
assimilation reinforces sameness, and therefore communalism is seen disrupting French 
values of a shared civic life, which France emphasizes is crucial to realize the common 
  2 
good (Fredette, 2014).   
Through the course of this thesis I will employ postcolonial feminist theory and 
argue that the veil was banned not to alleviate Muslim women from oppression as it is 
often argued, but due to the visibility of Islam in France; which has blurred French 
identity. The French state has maintained a patriarchal position by telling Muslim women 
how to dress while using an argument of women’s rights to justify this position. I will 
also argue that it is not Muslims who are failing to integrate into France; instead negative 
stereotypes that have been prevalent since colonialism has created a barrier between 
France and its Muslim immigrant community. It is second-generation immigrants who 
have now fallen victims to discrimination based on their “Arab” heritage which has 
demeaned their French identity, and resulted in a rejection of being accepted as equals in 
France. 
 Many politicians have argued that Muslims in France are refusing to assume a 
common French identity; instead, they are adhering to communalism, a notion the French 
Republic does not recognize since it views citizens in terms of individuals instead of a 
community. Communalism is feared as encouraging Muslims to place their religious or 
ethnic identity above a secular French identity. Bowen explains that, for the French, 
communalism separates “citizens by valuing their affiliation to communities over their 
collective participation in the nation” (2007, p. 156). Politicians have argued that 
Muslims who place their Islamic identity above their French identity have failed to 
assimilate and have dismissed the Republic’s values, which can result in the formation of 
fundamentalist communities. The segregation of Muslims from mainstream French life 
has been viewed as a threat and grounds to harvest fundamentalist ideologies. “Arab-
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Muslim Culture” has also been blamed for the high rates of poverty and crime that has 
become prevalent in immigrant dominated communities (Bowen, 2007, p. 163).  
The banlieues are low-income neighborhoods located in the suburbs of major 
urban agglomerations in France; the majority of the occupants in these banlieues are 
immigrants, and France has accused them of segregating themselves from the wider 
society. However, the clustering of Muslims in these areas is not due to Islam but rather 
to the discrimination and limited financial resources these inhabitants have to relocate. 
The banlieues in France have become a poverty trap for Muslims who are unable to 
escape, due to the lack of opportunities available to them; and instead of France tackling 
the issues of the banlieues such as improving the living conditions, and creating jobs to 
serve the communities, French officials have shifted blame on Islam as the main reason 
for Muslims failures. (Favell, 2001). The hardship experienced in the banlieues has ties to 
colonialism, and can be traced back to when the first Algerian migrants arrived in France 
and were discriminated based on popular Orientalist stereotypes of Arabs, such as lazy 
and violent (Said, 1979). Many European natives did not welcome Algerians into their 
communities due to the negative stereotypes that surrounded them. Many also feared that 
allowing Algerians to integrate would lead to a fight for valuable resources that should be 
reserved for the native French and European migrants (Macmaster, 1997). 
As a strategy to forcefully assimilate Muslims, France has attempted to ban the 
hijab from public schools on numerous occasions dating back to 1989; The French 
argued that the hijab created a barrier to assimilation. Muslim girls who were affected by 
the hijab bans were never given a voice in the debates instead they were portrayed as 
victims in need of saving. In 2004, France banned all conspicuous religious symbols in 
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public schools, a ban often referred to as the “hijab ban”. While the ban includes all 
religious symbols such as the Jewish Kippa, Sikh turbans, and large crosses, it was 
evident that the primary target was the hijab (Scott, 2007). In the 1980s the hijab became 
the center of public debates due to the increase of anti-immigrant policies that dominated 
society; Jean-Marie Le Pen a far-right politician feared that native French were 
diminishing (depopulation fears) and would be overpowered by immigrants. Therefore, it 
was key for France to reinforce strict immigration laws and eradicate visibility of foreign 
cultures such as the headscarf (Favell, 2001). Yet France’s struggle to unveil Muslim 
women can be traced back to France’s conquest of Algeria; where colonizers felt this was 
a backward practice that trapped women. Unveiling Muslim women became significantly 
important during the Algerian war of independence, where colonizers enforced the notion 
that Algeria was still not civilized, and by focusing on Women’s issues, France attempted 
to legitimate their colonial rule to the rest of the world (Shepard, 2006).  
The key three questions I will be examining in the thesis are: (1) how has 
France’s colonial rule of Algeria shaped postcolonial relations in France; (2) why are 
Muslims considered unassimilable in France; and (3) how have efforts to construct and 
defend French identity altered the position of/and, consequently, undermined the rights of 
Muslim women?  
France has failed to move away from colonial power relations as its Muslim residents are 
viewed as second-class citizens; France has also accused Muslims of resisting 
assimilation, when in reality France has rejected them due to the fear of Islam’s visibility 
in the Republic. In order to maintain colonial power relations, France has banned the 
hijab in public schools, this decision has taken the voice away from Muslim women to act 
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as free agents, and has forced them to live in daily confrontations between their religious 
beliefs and Republican values.  
The thesis is divided into three key sections relating to the research questions I 
intend to explore. The thesis will follow a narrative chronology dating back to the issues 
of colonial France and concluding with the hijab debates in postcolonial France. In the 
first section, I will use a historical materialist framework that provides a profound look at 
how history has shaped social issues in France. I will particularly focus on the shifted 
identity of Algerians, who went from being considered citizens during the colonial 
regime, to being considered foreigners after Algeria’s independence. The second section 
of the thesis will look closely at the 1980s, an era where racist discourse towards 
immigrants became most prevalent in France. I will also show how Islam’s visibility in 
the 1980s led to a target of the hijab in public school. The final sections of the thesis will 
focus on how contemporary France has rejected second-generation Muslims, and how the 
hijab bans in public schools have limited the rights of Muslim girls.  
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POSTCOLONIAL FEMINIST THEORY 
The term postcolonial typically refers to the period after European colonial rule, 
however postcolonialism does not have a fixed meaning; instead the term has been used 
to describe a “diverse range of experiences, cultures, and problems” (Bahri, 1995, p. 51). 
Therefore, postcolonialism has often been viewed as a broad study of the power relations 
between the colonizer and the colonized. Postcolonialism aims to investigate the impact 
colonization has had on colonized societies, and how this has influenced cultures in terms 
of literature, sciences, and arts (Bahri, 1995). First, I will cover postcolonialism through a 
review of Said, who examined the relations between Europe and the Middle East. Then I 
will analyze the postcolonial feminist writings of Mohanty who criticized Western 
feminist depiction of third world women, and Spivak who argued third world women’s 
struggles have been ignored throughout history. 
 Edward Said’s book Orientalism is often referred to laying the foundation for 
postcolonial theory. Said argues that:  
The Orient was almost a European invention, and had been since antiquity a place 
of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable 
experiences. Now it was disappearing; in a sense it had happened, its time was 
over. (1979, p. 1)  
Orientalism was most prevalent during the colonial regimes, which dominated the late 
18th century and ended in the mid-20th century, however decolonization has made 
colonialism less visible, but the Orient has not entirely disappeared. In France, Algerians 
or those from postcolonial territories still experience systemic discrimination based on 
their identity. Said explains:   
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Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing 
with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views 
of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as 
a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the 
Orient. (1979, p. 3)  
Said analyzed a range of Orientalist writers who all view the Occident and the 
Orient in terms of binary oppositions; A “them” versus “us” ideology, where the Orient 
represents everything the Occident does not. This level of thinking allowed the Occident 
to legitimize colonialism since the Orient was viewed as “uncivilized”, hence making it 
the Occident’s “responsibility” to civilize them. The idea of viewing the Orients and 
Occident in total opposition has also fueled the rise of modern identity politics:   
 For identity, whether of Orient or Occident, France or Britain, while obviously a 
repository of distinct collective experiences, is finally a construction — involves 
establishing opposites and ‘others’ whose actuality is always subject to the 
continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their differences from ‘us’. Each 
age and society re-creates its ‘Others’. (1979, p. 332) 
Said’s main concern in Orientalism, is the production of knowledge about the Orient. The 
Orientalist writes about the Orient without engaging with the people of the Orient; thus, 
the knowledge they circulate is not authentic as it is often influenced by biases of the 
dominant culture. The knowledge produced is also political since the Occident has the 
power to determine how others view the Orient. This reproduces cultural domination, 
especially since Oriental cultures are often portrayed as being inferior to Occidental 
cultures. The Orient is often viewed as a monolithic passive being who are not capable of 
  8 
representing itself, due to not being aware of what is good for it, and “representations of 
‘the Orient’ increase misrepresentation and misinterpretation” (Said, 1979, p.  xii). 
Chandra Talpade Mohanty, a postcolonial feminist, has also paid significant 
attention to the high level of misrepresentation, especially among third world women. 
Mohanty in her article Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial 
Discourses, is interested in the gender dynamics of colonial power relations. Mohanty 
argues that due to their gender women have always been subject to oppression; however, 
while patriarchy may unite the experiences of women around the world, women’s 
experiences also differ based on what part of the world they come from as well as their 
race and class. Therefore, this does not legitimize Western feminist to speak on the needs 
of third world women; especially since Western women are writing from a position of 
power, and often fail to acknowledge the differences among third world women who they 
categorize as monolithic. Mohanty understands the term colonization is both fluid and 
structured as it characterizes: 
Everything from the most evident economic and political hierarchies to the 
production of a particular cultural discourse about what is called the ‘third world’. 
However, sophisticated or problematical its use as an explanatory construct, 
colonization almost invariably implies a relation of structural domination, and a 
suppression often violent of the heterogeneity of the subject(s) in question. (1984, 
p. 333) 
Third world women have fallen victim to “double colonization”, where on the one 
hand they are oppressed due to native patriarchy and on the other due to imperialism, 
which also has marginalized women. Due to this “double colonization” third world 
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women have been unable to escape from being portrayed as victims. Western feminists 
are culturally privileged and have exercised power over third world women by producing 
knowledge on behalf of them since they are viewed as unable to represent themselves 
(Gandhi, 1998).  
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak who is considered a pioneer in postcolonial feminist 
theory focuses extensively on the depiction of the subaltern in her article Can the 
Subaltern Speak? Antonio Gramsci introduced the term subaltern to describe individuals 
who are considered an “inferior rank”; these include peasants, workers and those who 
have no authority and denied access to power. Due to the colonial power structure, the 
subaltern often falls victim to the hegemonic ruling group, which has access to means 
such as cultural and social institutions to influence how the subaltern is represented, and 
often disregards a true representation of the subaltern (Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin, 
2006). For Spivak, the subaltern does not have a fixed meaning since historically 
subaltern has excluded the experiences of women and focused on the struggles of men. 
Therefore, Spivak includes the experiences of third world women to redefine the meaning 
of subaltern.  
Spivak criticizes the neglect of women’s struggles. In fact, when one thinks of 
colonial oppression, accounts often relate to the experience of colonized men who are 
viewed as the primary gender. However, for Spivak the subaltern does not only include 
third word men but also women who, Spivak argued, are exposed to the worst form of 
oppression, since their voices are silenced, and their struggles were forgotten. Spivak 
draws examples from the British colonial rule in India where the British outlawed the 
practice of Sati, (widow sacrifice). She explains the British believed that they were 
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“White men saving brown women from brown men” (1988, p. 296). The ideology of 
saving the women has been used to legitimize the colonization of India by Britain. It has 
also categorized all Indian women as wanting to be saved, and it has failed to 
acknowledge the reason why Indian women committed such an act, for instance by 
arguing that “The women actually wanted to die” (1988, p. 297). In this sense, the 
women were portrayed as being oppressed by Hindu patriarchal practices (Gandhi, 1998). 
Yet the British expressed that they did not interfere with native custom/Law, however 
Spivak examined remarks made by J.D.M. Derrett in a colonial letter he read, which 
revealed: 
‘The very first legislation upon Hindu Law was 
carried through without the assent of a single Hindu’. The legislation is not named 
here. The next sentence, where the measure is named, is equally interesting if one 
considers the implications of the survival of a colonially established 
‘good’ society after decolonization: ‘The recurrence of sati in independent India 
is probably an obscurantist revival which cannot long survive even in a very 
backward part of the country’. (Cited in Spivak,1988, p.  298) 
While the abolishment of sati may have saved Indian women, it also portrayed 
them as individuals who are unable to represent themselves, and need to be represented 
by the British, since their native culture had failed them. In this sense, Indian women 
were objectified and portrayed as prize possessions to represent the “achievement” from 
colonialism. Their voices were silenced since no one bothered to question the practice of 
sati from their perspective, and a law was passed on their behalf without consulting them.  
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Said, Mohanty, and Spivak are all very important theorists who I will reference 
throughout the thesis. Said’s emphasis on how the “other” is constructed is important, 
since France has constructed Muslims as the “other”, whose identities oppose everything 
French universalism represents. Mohanty’s argument on Western feminist representing 
the needs of third world women as a monolithic group is also evident in the hijab debates 
in France, where the majority of French feminist viewed the hijab as oppressive. Spivak’s 
claim that the subaltern is silenced can also be seen in the hijab debates where Muslim 
women who veiled were not given a platform to speak, since they were seen as too 
oppressed to be aware of their own subjugation. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
Yin explains that “cases studies are pertinent with a research that address either a 
descriptive or explanatory question” (2012, p. 4). For this reason, I have chosen to 
employ case-study since my thesis centers on answering three key questions, (1) how has 
France’s colonial rule of Algeria shaped postcolonial relations in France; (2) why are 
Muslim’s considered unassimilable in France; and (3) how have efforts to construct and 
defend French identity altered the position of/and, consequently, undermined the rights of 
Muslim women? The thesis I have written is interdisciplinary in orientation and has 
combined literature from women’s studies, history, religious studies, sociology and 
political science, which has enabled my thesis to be applied to all these fields. Also, I 
have relied solely on secondary academic resources and have analyzed both quantitative 
and qualitative data. Case studies benefit from a combination of sources and evidence, 
and it encourages the use of a variety of methods to strengthen one’s research (Yin, 
2012). The specific method I used for data collection was narrative reviews; which tend 
to be “comprehensive and cover a wide range of issues within a given topic” (Collins & 
Fauser, 2005, p. 104). 
Due to the fact that I chose postcolonial feminist theory for my thesis, I had to 
examine the historical relationship between France and its Muslim colonies, since I am 
interested in understanding why Muslims have been considered unassimilable in France. 
This required gathering evidence from monographs which focused on French colonial 
history, and in order to fulfill this task I used search engines such as Google scholar and 
academic search engines. I then read the abstracts of the most cited books, and decided to 
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focus significantly on France’s colonial relationship with Algeria; since most of the 
historical books referred to it as being key for shaping Muslims postcolonial relationship 
in France. I also contacted academic professionals in the field who kindly provided a list 
of articles related to the research questions. One of the key historical books I have read 
was The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France, 
written by Todd Shepard. This book discussed the events related to the pre and post 
Algerian revolution, which was important since it helps one understand how Algerian 
identity has shifted and been comprised in contemporary France.  
 The second step of the data collection involved finding articles related to the 
treatment of the earliest Muslim immigrants in France. I once again used academic search 
engines, to locate scholarly articles. One of the key books I reviewed was Philosophies of 
Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain, written by 
Adrian Favell. I read the sections relating to France’s policies on integration; the book 
dates back to the 1980s, a time when immigration debates and policies dominated French 
politics. I summarized key events of both the 1980s and 1990s, which revealed a high 
intolerance towards Muslim living in France, and laid the foundation for the first attempt 
to ban the headscarf in public schools in the 1980s.  
During the third step of data collection, I also read a variety of academic articles 
which focused on the issues surrounding Muslim women living in France post 9/11. One 
of the books I examined was Hijab and the Republic: Uncovering the French Headscarf 
Debate, written by Bronwyn Winter. This book allowed me to understand the type of 
discourse that is often inflicted upon Muslim women; such as how the media has 
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criminalized them, and the way their voices were silenced throughout the headscarf 
debates.   
The benefit of doing a narrative analysis is that it provides an opportunity to 
connect a broad range of empirical research that has already been conducted. Not only 
does this enable scholars to generate an interdisciplinary and broad-based understanding 
of current social issues, but it also provides one with the ability to produce new 
understanding without the time and expense of fieldwork. However, there are also many 
limitations when relying on narrative analysis to collect data. For one, existing studies 
may be biased and written from the researcher’s perspective. Another limitation I faced 
was the fact that I do not speak French, and a variety of case studies were published in 
French, which meant I was not able to use them. However, to overcome this issue, I 
searched for a translated version or relied on research conducted by foreign scholars who 
had published their work in English.  
The thesis I have written is grounded in postcolonial Feminist theory which pays 
significant attention to the power of representation. Therefore, relying on research from 
scholars who are not French and/or Muslim meant that I had to be aware of the possible 
personal biases. For instance, I have referenced the book Why the French Don’t Like 
Headscarves, which was written by Bowen, a Caucasian, male, and American professor. 
His race, gender, and status puts him in a position of power over Muslim girls in France 
whose experiences he may not be able to comprehend.  
As a student living in the United States, I also have power over how I represent 
the Muslim community in France and have to be aware of my own biases and privileges. 
However, I am also a Somali, Muslim women who wears the hijab. I feel that I can 
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sympathize with the experience of Muslim girls in France. While I have not been 
expelled for wearing the hijab; I have come in contact with discrimination based on my 
dress code from the general public.  
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POSTCOLONIAL RELATIONS IN FRANCE 
 
This section of the thesis will explore the research question: how has France’s 
colonial rule of Algeria shaped postcolonial relations in France? I will provide a 
historical overview of the colonial relationship between France and Algeria, and discuss 
the Algerian fight for independence to provide a foundation for understanding current 
issues. Next, I will cover how the French used the excuse of liberating Algerian women 
to justify their colonial rule, and how the native Algerians manipulated the veil during the 
war of independence. Finally, I explore how France stripped French citizenship of 
Algerians, and the consequences this had on those who moved to France post-
independence.  
 
France’s Colonial Relationship with Algeria 
 
France shares one of its longest colonial histories with Algeria, which was 
colonized in 1830. The very first mission of the French colonies in Algeria was, how to 
cultivate and dominate the land they had just “inherited”. The French colonizers 
displaced native Algerians from the lands they owned by privatizing and granting it to the 
pieds noirs (People who moved from Europe/France). This led to many Algerians 
becoming refugees in their country and working for wages on the lands they once owned. 
Algeria also had different ethnic groups living in the country, and France organized these 
groups according to a hierarchy of “superiority”. Jews were viewed as the most superior, 
followed by Berbers and specifically Kabyle Berbers who had Caucasian features, and 
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then the Arabs who were seen as the lowest and racially inferior group, due to their 
darker skin and religion of Islam (MacMaster, 1997). Algerians are still discriminated 
based on these negative stereotypes from the colonial regime, however France no longer 
separates Berbers and Arabs, instead they are now clustered under the “Muslim” label 
(Fellag, 2014). 
In 1904 France’s demand for cheap labor intensified, and the French state granted 
Algerians free movement to France, this lead to an influx of Algerian men in particularly 
Kabyle migrating to France. The reasons for this were manifold: First, the Kabyles were 
highly encouraged to migrate due to their Caucasian features which French colonizers 
believed would help them readily assimilate. Second, the “Kabyle Myth” presented this 
group as hardworking individuals who were not lazy, in contrast to their Arab 
counterparts, who endured all the negative stereotypes of colonialism. For instance, 
MacMaster (1997) explains that negative comments about Arabs were typical of colonial 
discourse, and many were labeled as dishonest, sensual, stupid and lechery. The agenda 
to divide the Kabyles and Arabs as two separate groups were that it would make it easier 
to rule Algeria; this was a strategy many colonizers used to gain the loyalty of one group, 
while significantly oppressing the other. The Kabyles were also favored in the hopes that 
one day they would be the ones to encourage “the transformation of Algeria into a pure 
embodiment of French civilization” (MacMaster, 1997, p. 44). Finally, the influx of 
Kabyles was also due to their natural migration; many lived in the mountains and traveled 
and/or traded to make a living; therefore, a move to France for them was viewed in terms 
of their natural migration for work (MacMaster, 1997).    
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Once the Kabyles arrived in France, they were not treated as a superior race. In 
fact, many migrants in France were from neighboring Europeans countries (Italy, Poland, 
or Portugal) and were viewed superior to the Kabyles who became viewed as inferior 
Arabs along with Tunisian and Moroccans who many found difficult to distinguish 
between. The Arabs were seen as cheap foreign labor ready to be exploited; they worked 
in the most dangerous jobs with the lowest pay as these were jobs neither French natives 
nor European migrants wanted to fulfill. However, tensions rose when Algerians were 
used as the reserve pool of labor, replacing Europeans migrants who went on strike for 
better wages. This caused European migrants and Algerians to start competing for the 
same jobs, a concern the French natives did not have since their employment was 
prioritized in the Republic (MacMaster, 1997). 
The Algerian Kabyles who first traveled to France did not do so for the purpose of 
permanent migration; instead, they were there strictly for business and focused on 
generating income to send back home. Many longed for the day they could return to 
Algeria and after three years most men returned home and replaced their current position 
with a member of their family. Therefore, when Algerians were required to find 
accommodation, many did not prioritize living in permanent residencies, and most were 
interested in finding the cheapest rent, which was often located in the banlieues. This 
resulted in overcrowded living spaces, and due to the nature of their employment such as 
being exposed to harmful chemicals combined with poor living conditions, this created a 
stereotype of Arabs as disease carriers and unhygienic individuals (MacMaster, 1997).    
Landlords also preferred to rent to Arabs since they explained they could put three 
to four in one room and generate an extensive amount of profit; however, this caused 
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tensions with French working-class families who started to become displaced due to this. 
The fight for resources created heightened suspicion of Arabs, whose presence in urban 
areas such as Paris became visible, as most did not speak French and brought with them a 
foreign culture and clothing (MacMaster, 1997, p. 30). There was also a huge disparity 
between the male to female ratio of Algerians in France with 98% male and 2% female in 
1932.  Due to this news articles exaggerated crimes committed by Arabs reinforcing 
colonial stereotypes of Arab men as sexually frustrated, homosexuals or sexual predators. 
These depictions of Algerians created the fear that they would infect France’s racial 
purity by raping white women and children, and also spread disease in communities. 
Colonial and administrative lobbies feared the consequences of having a huge North 
African population living in France, and requested a block on their arrival. While their 
request failed, their campaigns were successful in putting immigration control on the 
agenda.  (MacMaster, 1997).  
The French officials explained it was crucial to surveil Algerians arriving in 
France for it was easy for them to go astray and not understand French culture, which 
was argued to offer too much freedom, making Algerians lose their morality. France’s 
colonial agenda was to civilize Algerians and fix their “backward” culture; therefore, in 
Algeria it was important to reinforce French authority by punishing Algerians for the 
simple act of disrespect. However, Algerians who arrived in France were able to escape 
this method of punishment and were able to receive the “same” treatment as everyone 
else, since France did not have an established policing system that specifically targeted 
Algerians or colonial migrants (MacMaster, 1997). So as a solution French officials 
decided to implement colonial policing inside France by requesting Algerians to carry 
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identification cards in order to surveil them and make the process of arrests easier. The 
notion of identification cards was a foreign concept to most Algerians who did not know 
their dates of births, and who were suspicious of police officers as such, Algerian 
immigrants retaliated by swapping ID cards, withholding information from officers and 
keeping themselves to themselves. Pierre Godin who was a former police officer and a 
member of the Paris city council proposed the creation of a special police force in France, 
called the Rue Lecomte which was dedicated to colonial migrants. The forces key 
responsibility was to administer North Africans. Their tasks included keeping tabs on 
North Africans living in France, maintain a record of North Africans entering France and 
ensuring that North Africans were provided the services they required. By having a 
separate police force dedicated to North African migrants, France believed that it would 
be easier to surveil them (MacMaster, 1997).  
During 1949-50 Algerian migration had significantly shifted to family 
reunification of women, children, and the elderly who were all travelling to France in 
significant numbers, with about 100 people arriving per month. The main reason for 
family migration was due to drought in Algeria, which increased poverty and hunger. 
Many French officials were concerned with the increased migration, but agreed that it 
was necessary due to the social and political tensions related to incipient calls for 
Algerian independence as well as to high levels of unemployment and severe hunger 
problems in Algeria. France had to step in and act as a safety-valve (MacMaster, 1997). 
Louis Chevalier who was a demographic historian, argued that in order for any 
emigration to be considered ‘worthwhile’, it was crucial for minorities to totally 
assimilate. However, he concluded that this would not be possible among Algerians since 
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Islam has a dominant power over them that will not allow integration (MacMaster, 1997). 
Although family reunification was encouraged due to the belief that it may help integrate 
Algerians into France, a variety of factors influenced the difficulty Algerians faced in 
relation to their integration. For instance (1) the racist discourse about “Arabs” had 
started to resurface in the media, (2) Algerians were discriminated when they tried to rent 
houses leaving them isolated, (3) the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), an Algerian 
nationalists party also encouraged Algerians to stay separated from the French since their 
agenda was to gain independence by proving the two nations were completely different, 
and (4) many French natives grew hostile towards Algerians due to the FLN whose 
discourse towards the French started becoming violent (MacMaster,1997).  
 The relationship between Algerians and Europeans worsened during the interwar 
years, when European’s started moving out of areas where Algerians started moving into, 
taking their children out of schools Algerians attended, and when public officials began 
to reject the construction of hostels or social housing programs intended for North 
Africans. The rejection of Algerians laid the foundation for the social problems they face 
in contemporary France, such as being segregated to the banlieue (MacMaster, 1997). 
 
Algeria for Algerians  
 
The Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and the Mouvement National Algérien 
(MNA) were both Algerian political groups that supported and reinforced the importance 
of Algeria’s independence. The FLN won against the MNA over the control of the 
Algerian community in France. The FLN was more militant and thereby used violence to 
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reinforce the idea that Algeria was not part of France. On November 1954, the FLN 
bombed pieds noirs living in Algeria, and this signified the beginning of the Algerian 
War. The FLN argued that “Algerians formed a nation defined by Arab culture, Berber 
roots, and Islamic tradition, that needed an independent state” (Shepard, 2006, p. 6). This 
was a notion that French officials found difficult to accept since all Algerians were 
officially considered French citizens since 1944, and Algeria was more broadly viewed as 
an extension of France and not a colony. Prime Minister Pierre Mendes-France argued in 
1954, that “Algeria is France, and not a foreign country”, an idea that remained dominant 
throughout the 1950s among French officials, but became exhausted during the upheavals 
of the War (Shepard, 2006, pp. 6-7).  
 The fight for independence centralized the issue of identity as France had to 
decide what it meant to be French, and determine who held citizenship rights. In 1962 
The Évian Accords were signed, and Algeria was granted its independence, France 
recognized that all those living in Algeria would now become Algerian. This worried 
pieds noirs who wanted Algeria to remain part of France, and also continue to be 
considered French in Algeria since this secured their dominant status. While it was not 
possible for France to claim Algeria, it ensured that Algerian’s could not claim to be 
French, a right they had since 1944, and in 1963 all Muslims living in Algeria had their 
French citizenship revoked. However, this did not affect the pieds noirs who lived in 
Algeria, nor did it affect Algerian Jews, who were allowed to keep their French 
citizenship, which granted them the rights to migrate due to fears of what might happen 
to this minority population in a Muslim dominated country (Shepard, 2006). France’s 
decision to revoke citizenship from Muslim Algerians, but allow pieds noirs to maintain 
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their citizenship, demonstrated that citizenship in France had reverted to the old ways of 
being tied to one’s ethnicity or descendant, since the pieds noirs were either native 
French or from another European country. This is also one of the earliest examples that 
demonstrates a rejection of Muslims as French. 
During the colonial rule of Algeria (1830-1962), “Muslim” was considered a legal 
term in France and did not have any religious significance. However, this shifted post-
1962, when the term Muslim implied a racially and ethnically different group of people; 
and it also became a justification to why Algerians could not assimilate into France or 
remain French citizens (Shepard, 2006, p. 12). Indeed, Charles de Gaulle argued that 
“you cannot possibly consider that one day, an Arab, a Muslim, could be the equal of a 
Frenchman?” (Cited in Shepard, 2006, p. 75). He also believed that Algeria should never 
be part of France, instead referring to it as a colonial project that had expired. While 
racist discourse was prevalent in France, the French did not take the step to legally codify 
Muslims into a specific race or ethnic categories. In fact, the French avoided doing this 
for all the migrants residing in France, and instead decided to remain colorblind. The 
reason for this is rooted in the French Revolution, which birthed the Republic and 
emphasized the idea of individual rights, whereby all men are seen to be equal, and also 
are viewed in terms of being an individual and not part of a group. While the notion of 
French citizenship did not extend to Arab peoples, the French paradoxically felt confident 
that they had the ability to convert any man from a different race into a French individual 
(Shepard, 2006).  
The main motive for France to deny the existence of other races was also to blur 
France’s growing immigrant population, and to ensure that by having them adopt a 
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French identity their loyalty would remain with France and not with their country of 
origin. However, for France, the loss of Algeria as a colony represented its biggest failure 
in convincing people in French territories to identify themselves as French.  
 
Manipulation of the Veil    
 
For French colonizers in Algeria, the veil had many negative connotations. For 
one, it symbolized an attachment to a native culture that rejected French superiority. The 
veil was for the French a barbaric and medieval practice, which isolated and 
dehumanized women. The French colonizers believed that the veil reinforced Muslim 
men’s control over Muslim women’s bodies and made a Muslim identity visible. In the 
1930s the French colonial administration enforced French identity and dominance in 
Algeria and encouraged Muslim women to unveil or forcefully removed the veil. The 
belief was that if Muslim women adopted a French identity, these women would come to 
appreciate the liberties France grants, and the rest of the family would follow. This 
colonial move was also meant to symbolize to Algerian men French dominance, since it 
demonstrated the ability to destroy Arab culture (Fanon, 1965).  
As the veil was often a central issue during the 1930s, it instantly resurfaced 
during the lead to the Algerian revolution of 1954. At that time, French officials wanted 
to sway international opinion and convince the United States that their presence in 
Algeria was crucial for Algerian women’s liberation. The key argument was that the veil 
was a backward tradition and the French were needed to modernize the country. This 
allowed French officials to deflect questions related to colonial oppression, since their 
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mission was still incomplete. To ensure that the world understood France mission of 
saving Algerian women, they released a film called The Falling Veil in 1958. This was a 
propaganda film, were French women were emancipating their Algerian sisters by 
showing them shops, and how to use the post office (Shepard, 2006).  
President Charles de Gaulle was also persistent on emancipating Algerian women, 
and emphasized educational programs for them. This significantly increased Muslims 
girl’s enrollment in primary education, from only 1,984 in 1889 to 76,610 in 1954, 
Female enrollment continued to grow, so that by 1958, 118,000 Muslim girls were 
enrolled in school (Shepard, 2006, p. 190). French officials were keen to relate to local 
Algerian women, and formed “Feminine Solidarity” centers run by French military 
spouses who were dedicated to emancipating native women. Once again education was 
emphasized as a way to convert native Algerian women to embrace France’s cause and in 
exchange show their loyalty. “Brigadier General Jacques Massu’s wife, who led the 
movement in the capital city of Algiers, stated: ‘Nourish the mind and the veil will wither 
by itself’” (Cited in Scott, 2007, p. 63). On May 16, 1958, Muslims gathered along with 
French natives in Algeria to rally their support for Algeria to remain French. However, 
what made this event epic was the public unveiling of Muslim women on stage by 
European women. According to Shepard (2006) “the Muslim women chanted, ‘Kif, Kif 
les françaises’ (‘let’s be like the French women’), this was a clear representation of 
Algerian women looking to the French women for guidance from backward patriarchy to 
modernity” (p. 187). The FLN denounced the allegiance of Muslim women at the 
demonstration by arguing that these women had been manipulated to attend by the 
French, for many were servants afraid of losing their jobs, or prostitutes. Most of the 
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women present at the event were from the Women’s Solidarity Movement; however, it 
does not change the fact that they could have also been manipulated or coerced to attend, 
given their vulnerable circumstances as many historians have explained. The purpose of 
this event was “to show the world that the French were not colonizers but liberators and 
that the natives supported L’Algérie française” (Scott, 2007, p. 63). 
Fanon (1965) notes that during the Algerian revolution, the veil had become 
significantly manipulated. Until 1955 the revolutionaries had been exclusively men. 
However, the FLN’s militant behavior became predictable by French officials, and in 
order to remain anonymous, the FLN made the difficult decision of incorporating women. 
The women who participated during the first years of the revolution did it unveiled. The 
reason for this was to fit in with the Europeans who lived in Algeria and not become a 
suspect; for they were required to enter bars carrying grenades in their handbags, and/or 
go to the bank to collect money intended to aid the revolution. The French intelligence 
later caught on, and the women in the FLN retailed by wearing a Haik (a veil that covers 
the entire body), which they could disguise packages with. This strategy was also 
discovered and some Europeans had sided with Algeria in the revolution, leading French 
officials to be suspicious of everyone and search anyone with a package regardless of 
their age, gender, or race.  
Given these events, the veil became a political tool for the FLN to demonstrate 
French resistance, and women who had once unveiled decided to veil again to show their 
support for an independent Algeria. For them, this was a revolutionary statement with a 
political message which spelled the rejection of France in Algeria. For example, after the 
public unveiling in May of 1958, Fanon (1965) notes that the connotations of the veil had 
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significantly shifted in Algeria. At first, women had worn it due to the Islamic tradition of 
separating the sexes, but during the revolution, it came to signify an opposition to French 
occupation, who were set on unveiling Algerian women. 
Mohanty (1984), has criticized Western feminists for constructing the image of 
third world women as a homogenous group who are subject to oppression, in comparison 
to Western women who are portrayed as liberated. The French also tried to reinforce the 
idea of Algerian women as oppressed and Western women as liberated. For instance, the 
establishment of “Feminine Solidarity” centers, public unveiling, and the creation of 
propaganda films where French women liberate Algerian women; all portrayed that 
Algerian women were in need of protection from their culture. However, the French 
women failed to acknowledge how colonialism double oppressed Algerian women, and 
failed to ask what Algerian Women wished to accomplish. Instead, they assumed 
Algerian women wished to unveil and wanted an education so that they could mirror 
French women. However, the participation of Algerian women in the Algerian revolution 
demonstrated that Algerian women were not victims who needed protection. In fact, they 
were strong, independent women who embraced the veil and wore it to portray their 
identity as proud Algerian women; they did not want to be liberated by French women; 
instead they wanted liberation from the French. 
 
Identity Crisis Post Algerian Independence  
 
After the Algerian independence, France wanted the pieds noirs to continue living 
in Algeria, for they believed this would create a healthy relationship between the two 
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countries. However, the pieds noirs did not feel comfortable to live in a country run by 
Algerians and decided to migrate. French officials believed that the best way to integrate 
pieds noirs, who became referred to as repatriates (returning to their native land), back to 
French society was for 400,000 to arrive over four years. This would provide the French 
state time to slowly integrate this large demographic. However, after Algerian 
independence 400,000 pieds noirs migrated to France within four weeks, an event 
referred to as the Exodus. This increased tensions in France where native-born French 
viewed the pieds noirs with suspicion, and not any better than the Arabs due to their 
socialization and violent, rebellious behavior in Algeria. France also had the added stress 
of assimilating the pieds noirs economically and politically so that they could feel at 
home (Shepard, 2006).  
Algerians living in Algeria were no longer French citizens and had now officially 
become Algerian, meaning that restrictions were placed on their entrance to France. 
Harkis (Algerian natives who fought on the side of the French during the War), did not 
feel safe in Algeria and also wanted to migrate to France. However, de Gaulle wanted to 
block their entry into France which violated the Evian Accords that the French and 
Algerian state had signed, which granted some rights for Algerians to travel to France 
(Scott, 2007). Algerians who wanted to travel to France had to be granted permission by 
high commissioners, who placed them on a list that prioritized pieds noirs migration 
(Shepard, 2006). The Harkis were also systemically discriminated against and any 
Muslims seen as “undesirable”, were denied travel. This list of people included single 
women, whom many feared would turn to prostitution, as well as the elderly and the 
disable, whom it was believed would not benefit the economy. France’s fear of Algerian 
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women turning to prostitution is a very Orientalist view. Said (1979) explains that many 
writers depicted Oriental women as promiscuous, and portrayed the idea that “the Orient 
was a place where one could look for sexual experience unobtainable in Europe” (p. 190), 
and hence France “feared” such experiences coming to Europe.  
De Gaulle disregarded the Harkis as repatriates; instead, they were refugees 
fleeing for safety. Many of the Harkis soldiers who were allowed to enter France had to 
plea to bring their families with them and prove that they could easily assimilate and 
make model citizens, for example by explaining that their families already spoke French 
and their wife could work as a maid (Shepard, 2006).  
Muslims who lived in France were no longer viewed as French citizens as they 
had now acquired the title of Algerian citizens. However, companies still needed the 
cheap labor they provided so many were able to stay in France. The change in citizenship 
had many negative consequences for French Muslims who were now vulnerable to 
deportation and stripped of the limited rights they had previously enjoyed. For example, 
elderly workers who were considered unproductive were targeted and deported (Shepard, 
2006). France was also not keen on integrating Algerians anymore, and the focus shifted 
to assimilating the pieds noirs. The next section of the thesis will focus on the post-
independence assimilation of Algerians and Muslim living in France.  
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THE QUESTION OF ASSIMILATION 
 
 
In this section I will examine the research question, why are Muslims considered 
unassimilable in France?  I will discuss how after Algerian independence, France felt 
rejected by the Algerians and thus rejected Algerian presence in France. Next, I will 
cover the racist discourse that dominated French political life during the 1980s, and 
discuss how it led to a target of Muslims living in the county. Finally, I will explore the 
first attempt to ban the hijab in public schools, and examine the reason it was not 
successful.   
 
Muslims “Temporary” Status in France  
 
Muslims who were living in France pre- and post-Algerian independence, 
including the Harkis were seen as a temporary case. It was believed that Muslims would 
return home once the French economy no longer needed them or once the political 
situation in Algeria improved. Many French natives felt displeased and insulted with the 
Muslims presence in France, especially since France was defeated in the Algerian War, 
by Algerians who they considered inferior. Therefore, Algerians who moved to France 
were viewed as trying to colonize "the land of the civilized ‘master'" (MacMaster, 1997, 
p. 2). Pieds noirs felt robbed of Algeria, and frustrated with seeing Algerians who they 
insisted were privileged to live in France. As a result, the pieds noirs and police officers 
often targeted Muslims, their behavior was mobilized by the far-right, who later formed 
the right-wing populist party, the National Front. Which fueled the marginalization 
towards Muslims living in France (Scott, 2007). 
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  The 1950s family reunification continued to grow till the 1970s and was highly 
encouraged. But Muslim migration was still considered temporary, and the services 
provided to Muslim children significantly differed from European children; for instance, 
public schools offered Muslim children Arabic and religious classes, so that when they 
returned home, they could easily assimilate. However, this emphasis on difference 
became the foundation for discrimination in France (Scott, 2007). Algeria and France had 
maintained a business relationship after independence, for Algeria relied on France for 
imports and loans. During the early 1970s, Algeria was becoming financially independent 
and started cutting business ties with France, Algerians were encouraged not to migrate to 
France in order to benefit Algeria’s economy. France again felt rejected by the Algerian 
government especially in 1971 when Algeria nationalized its oil and gas production. 
France retaliated by neglecting Algerians living in France by halting rehousing programs 
intended for them, and when Algeria finally had the opportunity to cut labor migration in 
1973, this resulted in racist violence and killings towards Algerian’s living in France 
(Macmaster, 1997). The French borders eventually closed in 1974 (although family 
reunification continued) for Algerian migrants, and many Muslims residing in France 
feared they would not be able to return to France if they left, which led to many making 
their residence permanent. French officials questioned the consequences of having 
Muslims live in France permanently. In particular, the state that this would lead to Islam 
colonizing and overtaking France.  
France’s inability to view Algerians as citizens is a retaliation to Algeria’s 
independence, a notion the French found hard to accept since they believed they were 
superior and Algeria was an extension of France. The French tried to make the Algerian’s 
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like them by instilling French values, and when Algeria was not “grateful”, France felt 
rejected. On the other hand, the Algerians wanted to distance themselves from the French 
for they felt colonization had stripped them of their autonomy and identity. However, the 
Algerians who continued to live in France experienced one of the earliest identity crisis, 
especially since a large majority were Harkis who supported France, and due to their 
religion of Islam were considered the enemy in France who were not entirely foreign nor 
citizens (Scott, 2007). 
The ascendancy of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, 1979, caused the French state to 
place its Muslim population under the microscope. It did not matter that Iranians were 
Shi’ites, who follow a different branch of Islam; in comparison to the majority of 
Muslims living in France who derive from North Africa and are Sunnis. Indeed, the 
French media failed to acknowledge this distinction and fueled ignorance and fear by 
categorizing all Muslims as a homogenous group with the same ideologies. Analyzing 
newspaper coverage from 1975 to 2005, journalist Thomas Deltombe, notes that French 
media correlated events that happened in Iran with crimes that individual Muslims 
committed, such as cases of forced marriage, enforcing the idea that Muslims have an 
alien culture. This led to a resurgence of colonial representations of Arabs as violent and 
out of control. Crimes committed by youths in the suburbs were also linked to their 
immigrant identity. In this way, “immigrants were equated with North Africans 
(especially Algerians), who were equated with Arabs, who were equated with Muslims, 
whatever the religious belief of a particular individual” (Scott, 2007, pp. 70-71).  
 Muslim women, on the other hand, were viewed as victims who could not escape 
the patriarchal nature of their religion. Those who wore the veil were either seen as 
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oppressed by male members of their families or were viewed as a threat to Western 
modernity since the French saw the veil as signifying an alien culture, religion, and 
political belief.  Bilge (2010) explains that the paradoxical portrayal of veiled Muslim 
women as either a victim or a threat is deeply rooted in colonial subjugation; where 
colonizers viewed veiled women as victims of a backward cultural practice or as 
signifying colonial resistance. Fanon (1965) has discussed the manipulation of the veil 
during the Algerian War, an era where Muslim women who had once unveiled started to 
veil in order to show their allegiance to an Independent Algeria, and a rejection of French 
rule or identity. Therefore, in France, Muslim women who veil are viewed with great 
suspicion. Indeed, many French officials have also argued that the veil is a symbolic 
representation of Islamic domination in France (Scott, 2007).  
 
“Failed” Integration  
 
The Iranian revolution dominated the media and centralized concerns of Islam’s 
place in France, since events that occurred in Iran were correlated with the actions of 
Muslims living in France. This also made immigration a central topic of political debate 
in the 1980s, and the treatment of ethnic minorities became politically influenced by the 
racist views of Jean-Marie Le Pen, a far-right politician. In the past, the integration 
process of immigrants focused on insertion, which emphasized socio-economic 
independence for migrants, such as finding homes, jobs and registering at their local 
home office (Favell, 2001). Any issues immigrants faced were often linked to economic 
difficulties, and their contribution was valued since it stabilized the French economy. 
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However, during the 1970s, France experienced a recession which led to welfare cuts and 
many fighting for limited resources, this resulted in a negative view towards immigrants 
(mainly Algerians), who were perceived to have easy access to resources that native 
French people needed. In the 1980s Le Pen, capitalized on social tensions by centralizing 
immigrants as the underlying cause of the issues France faced. The concern for far-right 
politicians more broadly centered on Islam’s place in the Republic and its threat to 
Western values.  
The racist discourse of the 1980s put Muslims in the spotlight as if they had just 
arrived to France, when in reality immigrants had been present in France, dating back to 
the early 20th century guest workers described earlier in this thesis. Muslims were not 
seen as full French citizens, and whereas integration previously prioritized economic 
conditions, it now shifted to an assessment on one’s “Frenchness” (Favell, 2001). Le Pen 
argued that Muslims had easy access to French citizenship. This was a problematic 
statement since he lumped all Muslims into one category, including undocumented 
immigrants and those who had the right to citizenship through birth. Le Pen wanted 
stricter measures to be put on citizenship before it was granted, such as “loyalty to French 
territory, culture, and history, and impose a strong cultural assimilation as a condition for 
political incorporation” (Favell, 2001, p. 54). Algerians felt extreme pressure since their 
independence represented a rejection of French universalism, so they had to prove that 
they were more French than the natives as a way to exemplify their assimilation to the 
Republic (Favell, 2001). 
Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux who was an academic adviser to the Haut Conseil à 
l'intégration formalized the requirements that were needed to transform the immigrant 
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into a citizen. This included a refusal to recognize minorities, in terms of their race, 
religion, culture and so on. This policy has also led to a rejection of collecting data based 
on one’s ethnicity, and the only mention of difference in a census is whether one had a 
grandparent who was of non-French origin, but does not state that origin (Favell, 2001). 
The argument in favor of colorblindness is that the collection of ethnic data serves to 
segregate people, and by avoiding it, can prevent prejudice and discrimination 
(Apfelbaum, Norton, & Sommers, 2012). However, postcolonial scholars have noted that 
the failure to acknowledge ethnic differences serves to reinforce the domination of ethnic 
French culture and identity. “The Le Chapelier Law of 1791 restricted freedom of 
association, institutionalizing the Republican skeptics of partial attachments and identities 
intervening between individuals and the state” (Chapman & Frader, 2004, p. 192). Hence 
France’s emphasis on a dominant French identity makes it easier to control citizens since 
they are being dealt with as individuals instead of ethnic and religious groups.  
The Haut Conseil Report, which was produced by the French state in the 1980s, 
called for an approach to cultural diversity that encouraged assimilation through 
education, and it also highlighted the importance of defining Islam’s place in France. The 
ideas of 1905 legislation resurfaced, and education was seen as a socialization 
mechanism, to create French citizens who become aware of their civic duties. The report 
also highlighted the importance of laïcité (French secularism, separation of church and 
state), as a way to ensure moral order and equality for individuals. Islam was also viewed 
as a religion that must be kept away from influencing the Republic, and due to laïcité 
must not be funded by the Republic. The report accepts that religion may provide comfort 
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for immigrants. However, religion should not be placed above the Republic since it can 
threaten secular principles (Favell, 2011). 
 
The Headscarf Affair of the 1980s 
 
The 1980s was a decade when the far-right gained popularity, and thus concerns 
about immigration heightened, and assimilation was encouraged to ensure that French 
identity remained dominant in a multiethnic and multicultural society. It should be no 
surprise that the hijab came under attack in this era, particularly as it is a visual symbol of 
Islam. On September 1989, three Muslim girls were “expelled from their high school, 
Gabriel Havez in Creil, for refusing to remove their hijabs” (Winter, 2008, p. 129). The 
incident was referred to as affaires des foulards (headscarf affair) and generated 
extensive media attention. The school was located in an area with a high “immigrant” 
population, and the school was considered to be in a priority educational zone (ZEP), 
meaning that the majority of students were economically disadvantaged, or at high risk of 
dropping out, and that the school experienced high staff turnover. “The Principal Ernest 
Chenière, had once referred to it as ‘une poubelle sociale (‘a social garbage pail’)” (Scott, 
2007, p. 22).  
Winter (2008) explains that the expulsion occurred due to systematic absences 
from students based on their religion; however, it was not Muslim students but rather ten 
Jewish students who did not attend school on Saturdays due to their Sabbath. On June 
1989, Gabriel Havez high school gathered the families and made a ruling that it was 
compulsory to attend public school on all the days it was in session. Through this 
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controversy, the issue of the headscarf was raised, and hence the three Muslim students 
were later told that headscarves were no longer permitted in school. However, they 
continued to wear it, arguing that it was part of their religion. Chenière justified expelling 
the Muslims girls as a way ensure and protect secularism. He explained that the public 
school is the foundation of laïcité, which cultivated the values of the Republic; it is a 
place where students learn and appreciate what it means to be French. Therefore, public 
schools must prevent negative influences, such as “the insidious jihad” (Scott, 2007, p. 
22). Major news outlets in France reported the incident, and this led to many schools 
following in the same footsteps by attempting to ban students who wore the hijab.  
  Union of Islam organization (UOIF) leaders got involved in finding a solution to 
resolve the issue, and communicated with the girls and the wider community, which led 
to a demonstration on October 22, where hundreds of Muslims gathered in Paris to repeal 
the decision. The incident became a media frenzy that captured the nation’s attention 
(Winter, 2008). The gathering of Muslims to protest the ban on the hijab in schools 
confirmed that Muslims wanted their religious identity to co-exist with their French 
identity. This was a notion that the French could not accept due to the fact that Islam does 
not have historical roots in the West.  Indeed, the French view Islam as an Oriental 
religion that represents everything the Republic opposes, such as Muslim women veiling 
in public spaces and the separation of gender; hence the two cannot co-exist since they 
are in binary opposition to each other.  
The official commentators of the hijab affair often discussed the importance of 
women’s rights. However, these commentators were all men, and women’s voices were 
silenced in the debates; which was surprising since France had argued since the colonial 
  38 
era that women were the tool for integration in Muslim communities, and influencing 
them would also influence their households (Fanon,1965). The lack of women’s voice 
made visible the patriarchal dynamics involved in French media coverage of the affair, 
particularly as men were given the power to discuss and influence the outcome of an 
issue that affected women. However, out of respect for religious and cultural differences, 
the commentators did include men of Muslim background such as the rector of the Paris 
mosque, who supported wearing the hijab in schools, due to its religious ties (Winter, 
2008).  The fact that Muslim women were not given a platform to speak, but rather native 
men or French men were given that platform, reinforced the double oppression Muslim 
women face. Also by involving the leader of a Mosque who argued in favor of veiling, 
the media actually reinforced the Western idea that Muslim men make women veil. In 
other words, the media maintained patriarchy by failing to bring women into the 
discussion (and allowing them to speak for themselves), and then shifted the blame for 
patriarchy onto Islam by having Muslim men say that Islamic values require veiling. 
 The final decision regarding the hijab’s place in public French schools was left to 
the Socialist Council and Minister of Education, Lionel Jospin who decided to refer it to 
the Conseil d’Etat (highest administrative court in France). On November 1989, the 
Conseil ruled that wearing visible religious symbols was compatible with laïcité, as long 
as the symbols were not ostentatious and did not influence the behavior of students who 
wore it or those around them, such as disrupting class or pressuring other students to 
convert their liberties. The Conseil ruled that teachers still had the right to evaluate a case 
by case scenario and exclude students who they believed to be disruptive in relation to 
their religion. Jospin later explained that this decision prohibited expelling girls who wear 
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head scarves to school, since this would deprive them of their education. (Scott, 2007; 
Winter, 2008). 
The 1989 headscarf affair generated a lot of indignation from right-wing 
politicians who wanted to ban the hijab in public schools. Many argued that the hijab 
corrupted women’s freedom and that it was a representation of Islamic power in the 
socially deprived areas of France. The veil also symbolized the reason why Muslims 
could never assimilate into France; and right-wing politicians further argued that in order 
to be accepted as full citizens Muslims would have to accept that the hijab was a symbol 
that conflicted with French identity (Favell, 2001). Although the hijab case of 1989 
settled the issue over the short-term, the issue was put on the agenda of many right-wing 
politicians and thereby resurfaced in subsequent decades. In 1993, Jospin was replaced by 
Francois Bayrou (centrist politician) as the Minister of Education. In 1994, Bayrou issued 
a ban on all ostentatious religious symbols in schools. This required local education 
officials to expel students who failed to comply with the rules (Winter, 2008). However, 
many found the task problematic since it was not an established law, and for the 
following five years the Conseil supported all students who wanted to wear a headscarf. 
Reinforcing the 1989 ruling that hijab was not incompatible with secularism (laïcité), 
Bayrou reasoned that a ban was necessary because the veil separated young people from 
each other; he argued the veil signified a difference of identity which would break up the 
national community (Winter, 2008). While Bayrou’s position is problematic from a 
postcolonial standpoint, his point regarding the threat to the national community is valid 
in the sense that efforts to prevent the wearing of religious symbols served to generate 
considerable national discord. Indeed, the vitriolic media coverage on this issue hindered 
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understanding of the hijab’s true meaning, causing French people to view one another 
with distrust. In my view, exposure to religious symbols are very important in diverse 
societies, with a high immigrant community, such as France, since these symbols allow 
students to become culturally aware and gain an understanding of religious difference. If 
religious symbols are suppressed, then this may heighten religious and ethnic 
insensitivity, fueling societal conflict. The next section of the thesis will focus on how 
France more recently has instituted legislation that legally infringes on the rights of 
Muslim women. 
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THE RIGHTS OF MUSLIM WOMEN 
 
This section of the thesis will explore the research question; how have efforts to 
construct and defend French identity altered the position of/and, consequently, 
undermined the rights of Muslim women? I will analyze the events that led to the hijab 
ban in public schools in 2004, and clarify how secularism was used to ground this 
legislation. Next, I will explore why France felt the hijab could not be compatible with 
the Republic due to its foreign connotations. Finally, I will examine the negative 
stereotypes towards Muslim youths, and explore how this has influenced the construction 
of their French identity.  
 
Banning Religious Symbols in Public Schools 
 
During the 1990s, as with the 1980s, issues of French identity and Islam's place in 
the Republic continued to dominate public discourse; the cuts in public welfare 
negatively affected immigrant-dominated communities such as the banlieues. The French 
state and media had often expressed the difficulties of assimilating its immigrant 
population, when in reality assimilation was never encouraged, since Muslim's residency 
was seen as temporary. The banlieues in France often refers to the suburbs outside major 
metropolitan areas. The banlieues are dominated by government-sponsored housing, 
which was originally built for poor French workers, and was intended to be a transitional 
stage until one could afford to purchase a home. Many native French have since moved to 
urban areas, which has resulted in the banlieues to be concentrated with a high immigrant 
  42 
population. Cesari (2005), explains the banlieues have become a poverty trap for 
immigrants, since they lack the financial means to leave, and those who do have the 
opportunity to move experience a significant amount of discrimination based on their 
race, ethnicity or culture making it difficult to relocate. Many young Maghrebian 
immigrants have felt France has turned its back on them and not given them opportunities 
to succeed. Indeed, many of the youth have continued to encounter the stereotypes of 
Orientalism, such as notions that Arabs are lazy or thieves. 
In the past immigrants had a close connection with their communities based on 
regional or ethnic ties and that these connections provided relief from the discrimination 
they faced. However, second-generation immigrants have not enjoyed such privilege 
since they were born in France and have themselves experienced an identity crisis related 
to their sense of rejection by their society. This feeling of stigmatization has led many to 
form allegiances based on their ethnic heritage or religious backgrounds, which has 
provided them with a sense of belonging and created the notion of “them” versus “us” 
(Cesari, 2005). In 1995, Khaled Kelkal a second-generation migrant of Algerian origin 
was believed to have partaken in Paris metro bombings and was shot by the police. In an 
interview recorded three years prior to the incident, Kelkal discussed his childhood in the 
banlieues of Lyons, in which he explained that the children of these areas did not have 
opportunities and needed jobs, and discussed how the police were negatively targeting 
them instead of dealing with the deeper issues of the community such as poverty. Kelkal 
was arrested for theft, and in a jail cell, he met a guy who introduced him to Islam. For 
the first time, he felt a sense of belonging, a brotherhood in the Muslim ummah 
(community). After he was released from jail, he experienced difficulty finding 
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employment due to his criminal record, and eventually turned to radical Islam 
(Hargreaves, 2007).  
The 1995 bombings in Paris increased fear towards Muslims, and French 
politicians viewed the banlieues as grounds for harvesting radical Islam and encouraging 
communalism. Bowen (2007), explains that communalism is when one closes themselves 
off from the wider nation into groups based on their ethnic or religious identity, which 
separates citizens, and encourages one to place their communal identity above the 
national identity. The 1789 revolution in France passed legislation that permitted only the 
state to shape French identity. It denounced alternative organizations that attempted to 
form their own identity, such as guilds or religious groups, since these were seen as 
infringing on the freedom the state had fought for during the revolution. The presence of 
Islam in the banlieues has thereby been criticized as a Muslim rejection of French values. 
The issue of the hijab did not receive additional media attention from 1995 to 
2000, apart from minor stories related to the wearing of veils in school gym classes. 
However, the September 11th, 2001 (9/11) attacks which were committed by Muslim 
terrorists on the World Trade Center in the United States negatively influenced media 
portrayals of Muslims in France, fueling fear and a new wave of Islamophobia. 9/11 also 
intensified the view that the banlieues were harvesting fundamentalism in France. 
Muslims were once again put in the spotlight, and the hijab became a symbol of radical 
Islam that posed a danger to the Republic (Bowen, 2004).  
As previously discussed, associating the hijab as a symbol of radicalism also has 
colonial ties to the Algerian war of independence, at which time Muslim women 
manipulated the veil in order to hide explosive devices to attack the French, or wore it as 
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a symbol to reject French Identity. In 2002 the hijab was put back on the political radar as 
“French journalists, intellectuals, and officials increasingly linked the problem of scarves 
in schools with three other problems of society: communalism, Islamism, and sexism” 
(Bowen, 2007, p. 155). In 2003 Nicolas Sarkozy a center-right politician insisted that 
women remove their headscarves for pictures in order to get accurate facial recognition, 
this ruling was justified by the concern of terrorism (Scott, 2007). Also in 2003, Jack 
Lang the Socialist Deputy presented a bill to the National Assembly to ban all religious 
symbols in public schools; he did not single out the hijab and used laïcité as a supporting 
argument, allowing him to remain neutral and not be accused of targeting Muslims. This 
divided the views of the Socialist Party, those who approved of a ban argued that it would 
prevent Islam domination, whereas those who disagreed with the ban argued that it would 
reopen colonial wounds for Arabs, who have felt the Republic has continuously denied 
their self-determination (Scott, 2007). In July 2003, French President Jacques Chirac 
wanted to investigate whether religious symbols (the hijab in particular), were compatible 
with secularism, and to investigate upon what grounds could a law that banned religious 
symbols be passed. Chirac appointed Bernard Stasi who created the Stasi commission 
which investigated the matter. 
The news to ban religious symbols, and in particular the hijab, in public schools 
reached the mainstream media, and generated a lot of press attention and scholarly 
discussions. The main concern was the connotation of the hijab in Islam, and its effect on 
Women’s status. Views towards the hijab were identical to that of the colonial regime, 
where some commentators argued that it was a major setback for women’s emancipation. 
The far-left party Lutte Ouvrière expressed that the veil was an oppression of women, 
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and many viewed it as symbolizing patriarchy. On the other hand, those who opposed the 
law argued that banning the hijab would not emancipate girls but rather isolate them, 
since many girls may feel rejected by mainstream France and forced to attend private 
schools, or enter early marriage due to the limited options they have (Scott, 2007). 
Bowen (2004) explains that many native French view veiled Muslim women as 
individuals who have refused to assimilate. However, while this assumption has been 
negatively reinforced by the media, the scholarly evidence does not support this claim. 
Keaton, an anthropologist, conducted an ethnographic study in the banlieues of France; 
she focused on how Muslim girls construct their identity. Her study was longitudinal 
dating from 1995 to 2004. The research is interesting since it was conducted prior to the 
headscarf ban. Keaton engages with different girls who live in the banlieues and 
concludes that it is not Muslim girls who have rejected France, but rather France who has 
rejected them via a process of social exclusion. Muslims in France are taught to embrace 
a “national identity” at school; however, they are segregated in neighborhoods that 
dismiss such teachings (Keaton, 2006), and it is Muslim youths in France that are most 
likely to experience an identity crisis. Aïcha from Keaton’s research expresses that “when 
I am in Morocco, people call me French, and when I live in France, they call me a dirty 
Arab. So I prefer to identify myself as ‘Aïcha a’” (2006, p. 35). Aïcha’s statement shows 
that while in her home country she is considered French, but France has rejected her 
identity as French, by using colonial stereotypes to portray her in pejorative ways. 
 While the hijab ban in public schools was a strategy to forcefully assimilate 
Muslims; Keaton explains that the motive behind the hijab was not that Muslims girls 
were unassimilated to France or that the hijab’s visibility was dominating schools. In fact, 
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Muslim girls wearing the hijab had significantly declined through the years, and in 2003 
it was documented that roughly 1,200 wore the veil to school in France, in comparison 
with a country that hosts roughly around 4-5 million Muslims. A survey conducted by Le 
Monde (French Newspaper) reported that: 
91 percent of teachers polled had never been confronted by a veiled student in the 
school in which they taught, while 65 percent indicated never having seen a veiled 
girl in their classes throughout their career. And yet 76 percent of teachers polled 
favored the law banning these ostensible religious symbols. (Cited in Keaton, 
2005, p. 417) 
The Stasi Commission which was created by the French state, released its report 
in December, and highlighted concerns that many Muslim girls were being “pressured to 
wear the hijab from parents, relatives or the environment, and some Muslim girls had 
directly or indirectly admitted to being pressured” (Ulusoy,2007, p. 427). The Stasi 
Commission had supported the ban on the basis of it violating public order and not civil 
rights. They argued that it was the responsibility of “public authorizes to protect public 
order by eliminating any kind of threat or external unlawful imposition towards 
individuals” (Ulusoy, 2007, p. 428). For them, this meant banning the hijab in all public 
schools. European laws regarding human rights only accept a ban on religious expression 
if it is for the purpose of protecting public order (Killan, 2007). Therefore, it was key for 
the Stasi commission to address the hijab as a violation of Muslim girl’s autonomy in 
order to make the ban legal. As the Stasi Commission limited the ban to public schools, 
the ban did not include university students who were assumed to be old enough to make 
their own decision. The ban was also not extended to private schools, which makes the 
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ban ineffective in dealing with parental pressure, since parents can enroll their child in a 
private school as an alternative (Ulusoy, 2007). 
The Stasi Commission failed to acknowledge the voice of Muslim women who 
veiled, during the hijab debates, since they were seen as being blind to their own 
oppression (Bilge, 2010). However, native French feminists were invited to give their 
input during the debates. The majority of the French feminists argued that the hijab was a 
symbol of oppression, and a representation of the gender inequality in Islam. Bilge 
(2010), explains that in order for the native French feminists voice to be viewed as a 
reliable source, a cultural insider is key, however, the cultural insider views must be 
reflective of dominant discourse in order to gain the support required. The cultural 
insiders that French feminists used were French women of Muslim background who did 
not veil. The French were interested in hearing the views of Muslim women who did not 
veil and who opposed the hijab in public schools, since it was believed that these women 
had become aware of the oppression the veil represented. Muslim women who veiled, 
and supported the hijab in public school were not given an opportunity to speak since 
their views conflicted with the dominant discourse.  All the Muslim women who were 
invited to give a testimony condemned veiling to the Stasi Commission, and their 
reasoning were reflective of Orientalist discourse, where they portrayed the veiled 
women as oppressed and Western women as liberated (Mohanty,1984). Djavann, who 
was used as a “cultural insider", spoke of her horrific experience in Iran. She explained 
that she was forced to veil for ten years, and every day was confronted with the fact that 
not veiling meant death. She concluded her statement that her experience made her an 
expert on the topic.  
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Amara, another “cultural insider”, was the leader of a feminist movement Ni 
Putes Ni Soumises (neither whores nor submissive), and also gave her testimony to the 
Stasi Commission. Amara as with other French feminists expressed the veil as being 
oppressive. She released a book at the beginning of 2004, a time which correlated with 
the heightened public hijab debates, where she focused on the high rate of violence in the 
banlieues. Amara’s central argument was that sexism was responsible for the violence. 
As such, she failed to acknowledge that the violence could have been linked to the high 
level of discrimination experienced by immigrants such as lack of job opportunities. 
Bowen explains that framing her argument in terms of discrimination would require 
costly policies to resolve it, whereas linking the issue with “Arab sexism called for 
denunciation and a law affecting Muslim women” (2007, p. 216).   
Bilge argues that it was common among feminists to link their opposition of the veil with 
the fundamentalist regimes in Afghanistan and Iran. For instance, Élisabeth Badinter a 
famous historian, philosopher and feminist expressed that by accepting the hijab in public 
schools, France had failed to confront gender equality for the purpose of religious 
tolerance. Banditer viewed the hijab as symbolizing women’s submission, further arguing 
that one could not reject the events in Afghanistan while accepting the presence of the 
veil in Europe, regardless of the fact that women wish to wear it (2010, p. 17). 
  Mohanty (1984) has explained that Western feminists have often misrepresented 
the needs of third world women due to a failure to recognize their own racial and ethnic 
privilege or to critically examine how Western notions about gender influence their 
perceptions about third world women. The Stasi Commission failed to create a platform 
for Muslim women to give different perspectives on veiling. Instead, the Commission 
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turned to native French Feminists and “cultural insiders” who portrayed Muslim women 
as a monolithic group with the same needs, when in reality the experiences of Muslim 
women in France drastically differ from the experiences of those in Iran and Afghanistan 
who are subjected to regimes that force them to veil. 
 The problem with the banning the hijab is that young Muslim girls do not have 
the ability to make a choice of their own, their actions are continuously being dictated to 
them by a patriarchal state which refuses to allow them autonomy. On the one hand, the 
state is arguing that it is protecting them from parental oppression, and while this may be 
true for some; the decision to ban the hijab is also a violation of human rights for others, 
since it is forcing girls to remove their hijab if they wish to receive a “free” public 
education; a right that has been limited to them based on their dress code. In this sense, 
the French state actively oppresses Muslim girls who wish to veil, which is an irony since 
France has grounded their argument is alleviating gender oppression.   
 France’s idea of “saving” Muslims girls is a continuation of colonial ideology. 
Spivak became famous for her sentence “white men are saving brown women from 
brown men” (1988, p. 296). As she explains, this was the argument the British used to 
justify the colonial invasion of India. This argument is also reflective of the French 
state’s reasoning for banning the hijab since it proposes that it is saving Muslim women 
from Muslim men. As I have previously demonstrated, this is not the first time France 
has used this argument, and can be traced back to the colonial regime where France used 
the argument of “saving Muslim women” to legitimize their colonial rule in Algeria. The 
hijab ban in contemporary France was not was not initiated due to secularism, but rather 
has a hidden meaning, that indicates France’s fear of losing its identity. The hijab ban in a 
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sense was a way to send a message to Muslim immigrants and in particularly to Muslim 
men who were viewed as enforcing fundamentalism, that a universal and secular French 
identity is a prerequisite for citizenship. 
 
Secularism  
 
The law to ban conspicuous religious symbols was passed on 15th March 2004. 
This legislation banned large crosses, Jewish kippah, Sikh turbans and Muslim 
headscarves from French public schools. While this was a controversial law, it was 
successfully able to pass in France due to the country’s history. The Ferry Laws of the 
1880s made primary education compulsory for all children regardless of gender; it also 
banished religion being taught in schools and religious figures such as nuns and priests 
from becoming school teachers. The purpose of this was to create a secular education and 
prevent children from being controlled and influenced by the Catholic Church, which was 
viewed as the enemy of France at the time (Scott, 2007). However, the law did not expel 
children who identified as Catholic, wore crosses, or other religious symbols to class. 
 A secular education was one of France’s earliest attempts to make religion part of 
the private sphere. On 9th December 1905, France passed the law of laïcité, which 
officially separated the influence of religion from all public spheres. One of the main 
reasons schools became the target for laïcité, was that schools have always been viewed 
as an agent of assimilation whereby one would come to value and learn a French identity 
by developing, “a shared language, culture, and ideological formation—and so a nation 
one and indivisible was to be the outcome of the educational process” (Scott, 2007, p. 
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99). Religious symbols such as the hijab were seen as preventing students from 
assimilating into the school system and also restricting girl’s behavior; for instance, many 
girls who wore the hijab would not participate in physical education, due to the hijab 
having to be removed (Winter, 2008). Such incidents reinforced the idea that Muslims 
were an unassimilable immigrant group; the headscarf represented resistance to the 
Republic and a violation on laïcité. Secular schools were created to transform children 
into French citizens; yet the ban on religious symbols expects students to have adopted a 
French identity before entering school, which defeats the purpose of laïcité as a 
socializing mechanism (Scott, 2007). While France claims that its public school system is 
uniformly secular, it is clear that the school calendar is significantly influenced by 
Catholicism, the dominant religion that controlled the state before the French Revolution. 
For instance, the school holidays are in sync with Christian occasions such as Christmas, 
and Wednesdays are half-day which gives Catholic children the opportunity to attend 
catechism classes. The state also funds private church schools in the promise that they 
implement the national syllabus (Hargreaves, 2007, p. 106). The Stasi Commission 
wanted to remain religiously neutral, and thereby recommended the recognition of the 
Jewish holiday Yom Kippur, and the Islamic Eid’s to be incorporated into the national 
holiday. They also encouraged that alternative options be provided in school’s cafeteria 
for students who do not eat pork for religious reasons. Accommodating such changes, 
they argued would show respect for France’s religious diversity, and allow Muslims to be 
part of the wider society (Winter, 2007).  The recommendations put forward by the Stasi 
Commission contradicted the new interpretation of laïcité, since it would bind the state 
and religion. However, it is clear that France is not as secular as it claims and that 
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Catholicism is intertwined in the school system, so it would also be fair and only right to 
accommodate other religions. 
In addition, the French state does not think that secular education is the only route 
to produce good French citizens, since it funds religious schools in exchange for these to 
abide by the national curriculum. The majority of these schools are Catholic private 
schools, although some are Jewish, and 20% of all French high school students are 
enrolled in religious schools. It is clear that France does not question the “Frenchness” of 
the majority enrolled in religious schools since Christianity is seen as a religion 
compatible with the Republic (Asad, 2006). Islam has not been accorded such a privilege 
as the French state has made it extremely difficult to allocate funds for private Muslim 
schools, limiting the choice of Muslim girls who are often forced to attend public schools 
that do not accept the display of their religious identity.  
President Chirac rejected the Commission’s recommendations for Jewish and 
Muslim students arguing that this may encourage communalism. For him, Christian 
holidays did not violate secularism (Scott, 2007). This proves that secularism in France 
favors a Christian heritage, and thus associates “Frenchness” with Christianity whilst 
rejecting other religions, complicating the idea of an authentic secular identity. Chirac 
reinforced the notion that the ban on conspicuous religious symbols was based on 
ensuring national unity and by abiding the rules of secularism this would be achieved 
(Killian, 2007). Chirac’s view on the hijab ban as a mechanism for national unity 
demonstrates that he feared French identity was becoming blurred, especially since many 
Muslims were French citizens and were portrayed in the media as a foreign threat. The 
hijab represented that immigrants were not in favor of abandoning their cultural heritage 
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for French culture (Killian, 2007), and therefore the ban served to reinforce that Islam 
could not be compatible with French identity. 
No Room for Hybrid Identity 
Scott investigated the language of Bernard Stasi  and his colleagues she argues 
that they expressed: 
The headscarf ban was necessary to prevent a takeover of the school by ‘the 
street’. The battle was cast as a veritable ‘crisis’, a war to the death between polar 
opposites: in abstract terms, between the Republic and religion, modernity and 
tradition, reason and superstition; in concrete terms between contemporary France 
and Islam. (2007, p. 98)  
Viewing the hijab in these terms is very Orientalist. Said (1979) explains that the 
Occident viewed the Orient in terms of binary oppositions; hence the Orient represented 
everything the Occident did not, with the Occident in a superior position. In this sense, 
Islam is viewed as the Orient in France and Muslims are seen as representing everything 
the Republic does not, giving France the leverage it needed to reconstruct the identity of 
Muslim citizens in France according to French worldview. 
Scott’s reference to Stasi’s comments of the street taking over the school is 
related to the fear communalism presence in the school. Bowen analyzed the book The 
Lost Territories of the Republic, which was produced by a school teacher. The book was 
released in 2002, and addresses concern of Muslim students whose religion and culture 
alters the way they behave at schools, such as breaking their fast during Ramadan in 
school, being disruptive during history lessons, female students refusing to work with 
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male classmates and Arab students discriminating against Jewish students. The author 
argues that all these behavioral traits are inherited by Arab-Muslim culture (2007, p. 
163). By linking student’s behavior to communalism, the book insinuates that these 
students have rejected assimilation into France, and are placing their communal identity 
above the nation, thus legitimizing their disruptive behavior in class. It fails to 
acknowledge that students who are disruptive may not be due to communalism but rather 
due to the failed school system in their communities, which has failed them by not 
addressing problems such as high staff turnover, or by failing to acknowledge the 
systemic discrimination that perpetuates poverty among French Muslims. The book was 
also released a month after it had been reported anti-Semitism increased in France.  
Despite the fact that neo-Nazis were the main sources of these attacks, the book led many 
French people to blame Muslims for the violence, a pattern France has developed to 
divert attention from the deeper issues of the situation (Bowen, 2007). The book is also 
believed to have justified Chirac’s decision to encourage a ban on headscarves in public 
schools. Since it provided an alternative reason that would not violate freedom of religion 
expression, which required proof of disruptive behavior to legitimate a ban. Instead, it 
provided a link between the hijab and communalism in school, where wearing the veil 
symbolized separation of the sexes, and a refusal to intermix with the opposite sex; which 
is a violation of Republican values which encourages equality between the sexes and 
citizens mixing with each other in order to promote assimilation. Many politicians and 
public officials denied the existence of communalism in their schools; however, the book 
raised public concern, and influenced the creation of the Stasi Commission.  
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Are Muslim Youths the Problem?   
 
France has often accused Muslim youth of failing to assimilate and viewed the 
hijab as a threat; however, it is clear that the hijab did not pose a threat to secular 
education as the majority of teachers who favored the ban had never seen a veiled student 
in their class (Keaton, 2005). It can be argued that these teachers may have been 
influenced by negative stereotypes of the hijab in the media, where the hijab routinely has 
been portrayed as a source of oppression. French media also has portrayed Muslim boys 
"as their sister's oppressors" (Cesari, 2005, para. 15).  
This view of Muslims is very typical of Orientalism where women were often portrayed 
as victims of male patriarchy, and men portrayed as aggressive oppressors (Spivak, 
1988). 
Muslim boys in France are also seen as unassimilated, Silberman, Alba and 
Fournier's (2007) study on second-generation immigrants in France revealed that the 
largest disadvantaged immigrant group in France are those of Maghreb origin. They 
argue that this group is headed towards a "downward assimilation" (p. 23), something 
which they encounter at school and the labor market. While second-generation 
immigrants leave school at a younger age than native French, the high level of 
unemployment this group experiences is not exclusively related to the different level of 
educational attainment, but also racism they encounter. Many of Maghrebins are aware of 
this and have attributed their difficulty of finding employment to the color of their skin or 
their ethnic names (p. 25).  
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In 2005 riots broke out in the banlieues, many American commentators linked the 
riots to Islam extremism; however, European commentators acknowledged that economic 
deprivation was a primary cause for rioting. The majority of the rioters were of 
immigrant Muslim background; however, the riots were not perpetuated by Islam 
(Laachir, 2006) and the rioters were not against France, but rather made a desperate plea 
to be assimilated into France. The youth of the banlieues have often been treated as 
second-class citizens and remain profoundly excluded from the opportunities available to 
French natives. Immigrant youths have been stereotyped as a social problem due to their 
heritage, and France has neglected their needs with poorly funded schools, and by failing 
to address workplace discrimination. One strategy used to stop the riots was aggressive 
policing, which reflected 1955 policing in France towards Algerians who wanted 
independence. Police officers were given permission to stop and search, place suspects 
under house arrest, and enforce curfews (Laachir, 2006). France's permission to grant 
police unlimited power over the rioters is rather ironic since the riots sparked due to the 
accidental death of two boys who were being chased by the police, and who died from 
hiding in a power substation. This incident angered the youth of the banlieues due to 
continuously being targeted by the police (Scott, 2007).  It is clear that second-generation 
immigrants continuously face the same level of racism their parents faced since their 
arrival in the Republic. France has failed second-generation immigrants by treating them 
as foreigners regardless of the fact that most were born in France, causing immigrant 
youths to riot in order to gain the recognition they deserve.  
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CONCLUSION 
France has used Muslim women’s bodies to reinforce a rejection of Islam in 
France. The 2004 ban on conspicuous religious symbols in public schools, mainly 
targeted the headscarf worn by Muslim girls. While the number of girls who wore the 
hijab in public schools was declining, France still pushed for a ban. The purpose of this 
was that French identity had become blurred due to the influx of immigrants. France had 
always viewed immigrants as guest workers who were destined to return home. However, 
the family reunification programs and closing the French border in 1974, led to many 
immigrants settling and making France their permanent home. The newly arrived 
immigrants were mainly Muslims from former colonies whose culture and religion was 
foreign to the Republic. The fact that Algeria had also defeated France in the war for 
independence, created an atmosphere of rejection and hostility towards Muslims arriving 
in France. 
 Muslims living in France experienced hardship during the 1970s economic crisis 
since they were fighting for the same resources as French natives and European migrants, 
which led to a high level of unemployment and poverty. The consequences of the 1970s 
economic crisis in France are still felt today, and has negatively affected immigrant youth 
who have been raised in poverty, and who are unable to escape due to the high level of 
marginalization they face in society. France’s relation towards its Muslim population is a 
continuation of Orientalism, and Muslims are treated as second-class citizens who can 
never be equal to native French citizens due to their foreign heritage. Viewing Muslims 
as a binary opposition to French natives has also solidified Orientalist stereotypes that 
portray Muslims as threatening and backward.  
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The banlieues in France have often been accused of harvesting extremism and 
influencing the youth to rebel; in order to control the perceived Islamization of France. 
Muslim women’s bodies have been used as a political tool by the Republic: by banning 
the hijab in public schools, the French state sends a clear message that Islam is not 
welcome. This usage of women’s bodies as a political tool can be traced back to the era 
of the Algerian war of independence, where Muslim women were publically unveiled to 
symbolize French authority and denounce an independent Algeria. These events 
demonstrate that France has associated the veil with a foreign culture that denounces 
French identity. Moreover, women who veil are usually excluded from public debates 
concerning their dress code; instead, arguments are made on behalf of them by their 
Western sisters who wish to liberate them, “cultural insiders” who are Muslim women 
that condemn veiling, Muslim brothers who wish to secure their dignity or Western 
politicians. Failing to create a platform for Muslim women who veil reinforces the double 
oppression they face from their native culture and western culture (Gandhi, 1998). 
Muslim women who veil are seen as victims who are too weak to represent themselves 
and thus need protection, when in reality Muslim who veil women are capable of being 
politically active. However, the media is not interested in their insights as these are 
overpowered by the discourse of the dominant culture.  
Arab-Muslim culture has often been blamed for the failure of assimilating both 
Muslim boys and girls into wider society; however, Muslims have not failed at 
assimilating into France, Scholarly evidence suggests that the majority of Muslim French 
youths are eager to embrace their French identity, but it is France who has failed them. 
Muslim youths predominantly attend underfunded schools where dropout rates are high 
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increasing their rates of dropout, are criminalized based on their appearance, and are 
discriminated against when they enter the labor market. Thus, France must stop blaming 
Muslims for their failure and take responsibility for treating them as second-class citizens 
who have been neglected by the state. The state may play a more effective role in terms 
of assimilating French Muslims by introducing legislation that improves schools and 
expands immigrants access to jobs.  
France emphasizes a secular state where all individual adhere to a national 
identity; However, France is not as secular (separation of church and state) as it claims, 
instead the education system and public holidays are intertwined with Catholicism. 
France rejects the idea of difference and encourages assimilation, but they are 
encouraging an assimilation that favors Christianity and a European culture which 
conflict with Islam, failing to meet Muslim needs. The biggest consequence of enforcing 
assimilation to a secular identity is that it has silenced France’s religious minorities, 
especially since France is not an authentic secular state. France refuses to recognize 
religious, cultural or ethnic differences which have led to the neglect of acknowledging 
racism and discrimination that are commonly encountered by most second-generation 
immigrants. It is clear that France colorblindness approach has drastically failed, and in 
order for Muslims assimilation to be considered successful, France must stop viewing 
them in the context of Orientalism. Instead, France needs to learn to embrace their 
country’s cultural and religious diversity, where Muslim girls are made to feel welcomed 
and protected from the double oppression they face at “home” and by the state. Only by 
embracing differences and focusing on the success of Muslims integration, instead of 
their “failure” to assimilate can France accept that Islam is compatible with the Republic, 
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until that point, France will always be in conflict with a community that has felt rejected 
since its arrival.  
Writing a thesis on France’s relation to its Muslim residents has also allowed me 
to reflect on my experience as a Muslim Women who veils and lives in the United States.  
I have been subject to a significant amount of discrimination based on my dress code. 
The general public has often made remarks such as “go back to your country” or have 
stared at me while I walk with my family, and when I have asked for help in stores they 
have spoken to me in patronizing ways, and have asked if I understood what they have 
said. Regardless of the fact I have asked the question in English, a language I speak more 
fluently than my mother tongue. However, due to my dress code, and the color of my 
skin, I was perceived as a foreigner who could not be considered a citizen, and must have 
language difficulties. This demonstrates that America’s view of Muslims is no different 
from France, since Muslims are viewed as foreigners who can never be accepted as 
citizens. Muslim have also become the center of American politics after the succession of 
Trumps presidency in 2017. Trump's attempts to ban Muslims entrance to America has 
also increased hostility towards Muslims, where a few American’s feel their 
discrimination towards Muslims has been legitimized. America, as with France, views 
Muslims as the “other”, and are seen as representing an identity in opposition to theirs.  
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